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Abstract Questions on what it means to live and die well
are raised and discussed in the hospice movement. A
phenomenological lifeworld perspective may help profes-
sionals to be aware of meaningful and important dimen-
sions in the lives of persons close to death. Lifeworld is not
an abstract philosophical term, but rather the opposite.
Lifeworld is about everyday, common life in all its aspects.
In the writings of Cicely Saunders, known as the founder of
the modern hospice movement, facets of lifeworld are
presented as important elements in caring for dying
patients. Palliative care and palliative medicine today are,
in many ways, replacing hospices. This represents not only
a change in name, but also in the main focus. Hospice care
was originally very much about providing support and
comfort for, and interactions with the patients. Improved
medical knowledge today means improved symptomatic
palliation, but also time and resources spent in other ways
than before. Observations from a Nordic hospice ward
indicate that seriously ill and dying persons spend much
time on their own. Different aspects of lifeworld and
intersubjectivity in the dying persons’ room is presented
and discussed.
Keywords Lifeworld  Hospice  Palliative care  Ethics
in end-of-life-care  Evidence-based
Introduction
‘A life well lived’. Walking between gravestones in an
English graveyard some time ago, my1 eyes fell on this
inscription. A woman was buried there; she died at a good
old age. I was touched by the inscription, and I have
continued to think about it. Perhaps this is a common
gravestone inscription in England, but to me, as a Nor-
wegian, it presented something new and different. The few
words made me wonder about the woman’s life––what it
had been like, what she had experienced and what she had
been through. Was ‘a life well lived’ her wish for the
inscription, or was it how her relatives judged her life?
‘Well lived’ touched me, not because it made me think
about a very special or interesting life, filled with mag-
nificent events, but because the inscription on a plain
gravestone in a windswept graveyard made me think about
making use of life’s opportunities. It was not a question
about being able to cope with life, but of living life to the
full. The words ‘well lived’ made me think about a life that
had been meaningful and fulfilled, in one way or another,
within the basic dimensions and borders of life. Dimen-
sions such as sociality, time, space and embodiment rep-
resent something fundamental and common to all lives,
something that opens life up to us, something that contains
possibilities, but also ambiguity and restrictions. How the
old woman had lived and what she had achieved in time
and space, and how and to whom she had been connected, I
will never know.
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What a life well lived, or a good life actually means has
been a philosophical issue through history. In this paper,
the focus is on the end of life and especially on end-of-life
care in hospices. Questions and reflections on what it
means to live well and to die well have been raised and
discussed in the hospice movement since the 1960’s and
1970’s. In this paper we present a phenomenological per-
spective on end-of-life care in hospice. Phenomenology
offers a variety of philosophical thinking and discussions.
We find that it is important to consider hospice care with
the phenomenological concept of lifeworld. One may say
that lifeworld sums up the essence of phenomenology,
which is to revive our living contact with reality (Moran
2000). Reality is the experienced world, the world as it is
given and experienced by each one of us. The world as
given means that the world is already there before us. Prior
to our thinking of life and of the world, there are already
grounded dimensions in life which form our lives and
which we cannot escape; we live and die as embodied
subjects, and we are always connected to the world and to
others. Lifeworld is not an abstract philosophical concept,
but rather the opposite; human life is concrete and mean-
ingful, and the subject is intimately tied to the world, to
concrete life (Moran 2000; Finlay 2009). We normally take
these given life structures for granted; we do not often
think about them (Moran 2000; Bengtsson 2006). Never-
theless, we believe that in reflecting on what a life well
lived and well ended means, or what it consists of, the
concept of lifeworld is significant because it reminds us
about something already given. In developing knowledge
on end-of-life care, we find it necessary to ask what kind of
knowledge, meaning and normativity is already present in
the life of the person who is dying. What Dahlberg et al.
(2009) and Todres et al. (2007) call the human––world
intimacy reminds us of grounded and deeply meaningful
structures in life and the importance of making these vis-
ible (Martinsen and Eriksson 2009).
The goal of this paper is to explore more closely con-
nectedness and relations as grounded and deeply mean-
ingful structures in hospice philosophy and contemporary
hospice practice. We will point to two reasons why we find
these to be important issues to focus: in medicine and
nursing, the request for evidence-based knowledge and
practice is strong. According to Husserl, there is already
evidence in the world we live in, in subjective and inter-
subjective living (Moran 2000). There are aspects of life
that are visible, such as social life and relations, but which
also carry an invisible, deeply important meaning (Dahl-
berg 2006). Making the grounded structures more explicit
may help us to see their importance. The meaning
embedded in every person’s lifeworld, and in the relation
between us, gives lifeworld an ethical and normative
impact. There is an ethical source in the connectedness
which implies that it is essential to be aware of the social
dimensions of life (Wyller and Heimbrock 2010). We
analyse how connectedness is described in parts of the
extensive writings of Cicely Saunders, who is recognized
as the founder of the modern hospice movement (Clark
2004; Clark et al. 2005). We also ask how the intersub-
jective life of the patient is attended to and realised in
contemporary hospice practice. The question will be
answered and discussed by describing some observations
made by the first author in a Nordic hospice ward.
We start with a short section on the phenomenological
theory on lifeworld.
Lifeworld
Phenomenology is characterized as a renewal of philoso-
phy through its preoccupation with the physical, concrete
life and living (Moran 2000). Lifeworld was developed as
part of Edmund Husserl’s scientific critique against scien-
tism, rationalism and objectivism. According to Husserl,
we tend to accept scientific knowledge as neutral, real and
true. We tend to think that there is a reality out there, an
objective truth, independent of history, culture and sub-
jectivity. This is such a normal way of acknowledging
scientific knowledge that Husserl labelled this ‘‘the natural
attitude’’, an attitude present in theories as well as in
everyday living. Husserl was clearly critical of such a
scientific view of the world, and he describes naturalism as
a ‘‘philosophical absolutising’’ (Moran 2000:143). What
seemed neglected is that there is always a human factor in
all human activity, including professional nursing, scien-
tific work and the development of scientific and evidence
based knowledge.
Lifeworld is not an abstract concept, but something very
real and close to us. Lifeworld is our daily life; the world
we live in here and now. It is what we take for granted,
what we do not question or reflect upon, but rather, live.
We live bodily, physically and practically, and we live with
others. Lifeworld is a shared and meaningful world (Zahavi
2003; Schutz 2005). Before we start to think about the
world and about everything going on around us, we must
assume the world is already structured, shaped and mean-
ingful. This is what Schutz calls common sense thinking
(Schutz 2005).
The subject, be it a researcher, a nurse, a patient or a
little child, is a non-questioning part of the lifeworld. The
nurse and the patient are bodily, socially and culturally in
the world. One cannot escape or live outside lifeworld; we
are bound to subjectivity. This means that there are no
absolute zero from where we can explore lifeworld,
because we are already part of it as researchers and writers,
and we always experience, perceive or explore from a
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perspective (Bengtsson 2006; Dahlberg 2006; Thoresen
2010).
Hospice: an introduction
The modern hospice movement seems to have become
synonymous with particular places and ways of dying well
(Clark et al. 2005). The development of hospices as places
of a specific caring philosophy, and concrete attitudes and
practices towards dying patients, is well described by Clark
and others (Clark and Seymour 1999; Thoresen 2001;
Clark 2002; Clark et al. 2005). What becomes clear from
historical descriptions is that hospices as representing a
modern philosophy of terminal care are closely linked to
Cicely Saunders (1918–2005). We know that from the
early start, others were involved in the hospice movement,
both professionals as well as ‘lay’ people, but it was
Saunders who actively developed what was to become
hospice philosophy from around 1947 (Clark et al. 2005).
This means that we are tracing the first steps back more
than 60 years. When reading Saunders’ writings today, it
should not be forgotten that we are engaging with historical
texts, written in the context of a specific time, society,
culture and health care system. What we also find to be
interesting from a phenomenological point of view is how
Saunders biography and especially her relationships with
certain patients came to colour and influence the devel-
opment of hospice. Saunders, initially trained as a nurse
and a social worker, became aware of the anxieties and
sorrows surrounding death when she got to know David
Tasma, a relatively young Polish Jew (Saunders and Ka-
stenbaum 1997). As a professional carer, she followed him
through his last stages of life. They developed a close
friendship, and, to Saunders, the experiences and insights
that grew from the friendship became the basis for what
was to become the hospice movement. Tasma felt let down
by society, by illness and by himself, and is described as an
unhappy man. Among other themes, Tasma and Saunders
discussed the possibility of creating special places or
homes for patients who were close to death. The story of
David Tasma and especially the fact that he left Saunders
some money in his will ‘‘to be a window in your home’’
(Saunders and Kastenbaum 1997:4), has become a ‘crea-
tion’ narrative, retold many times by Saunders herself.
After her experiences with Tasma, Saunders was advised to
read medicine if she wanted to contribute to changes in
contemporary practice and attitudes towards death and
dying. She followed this advice, and after finishing her
medical studies, Saunders started to work as a doctor at St.
Joseph’s Hospice in London. Here, she ‘‘transformed the
ward’’ (Saunders 1996:1599) by introducing morphine on a
regular basis and by creating medication routines and a
report system. Nevertheless, perhaps the fact that Saunders
spent hours listening to the patients, to their life stories, to
their loss and joy, and to the narratives of their serious
illnesses was what really mattered. Through patients’ sto-
ries, Saunders understood that dying patients often felt
themselves abandoned by society, doctors and nurses, and
often by friends and family (Saunders 1984, 1996; Clark
1998). In a time (post-Second World War) when medicine
developed rapidly, the main goal was treatment and reha-
bilitation, and dying had become perceived as a failure
(Clark 1999a), and as something almost shameful (Saun-
ders 1998). In the UK, dying patients were cared for very
badly in some hospitals. We are told that they did not
receive proper medical treatment, and they were often
hidden in side rooms, away from the more active parts of
the hospital. Patients received medical treatment, but no
care for distress. Even if health care was Saunders’s pro-
fessional field, she found it important to try to influence the
British culture and ideas on death and dying, and she often
raised her voice in the public sphere to point to the time
before death as an important and meaningful time for all
involved.
The last 15–20 years has seen a growing interest in end-
of-life care, in all Scandinavian countries, the rest of Eur-
ope and the world. Today, the name and concept of hospice
is often replaced with the term palliative (Clark and Sey-
mour 1999). Palliative teams, palliative wards and even
palliative beds are offered at different levels in public
health care. For different reasons, some hospitals and wards
still cling to the original hospice name. The change from
hospice to palliative care and medicine has implied much
more than just a new name. The first hospices offered a
special room or place to stay near the end of life, when
curative medical treatment was no longer possible. Today,
the transition between curative and palliative care is vague,
and many patients die whilst still under active curative
treatment. The cure is much more active and requires
advanced techniques and skills. Improved palliation means
that patients experience less painful symptoms, a devel-
opment that most of us value. On the other hand, this is an
improvement that requires a lot of resources and time, and
one may ask if focus is moved from care to cure, even if the
patient is dying. The changes and development in hospice
and palliative care have been welcomed, but have also
made some ask if core hospice values are lost or margin-
alized (Clark and Seymour 1999; Field 2007).
Hospice: a modern philosophy
When Cicely Saunders died in 2005, she had authored
around 220 publications on hospices, and their philosophy
and practice. There are different themes in her articles, and
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Saunders compared the process that created hospices with a
kaleidoscope, putting together different demands that pre-
viously did not relate to each other (Saunders 2000). Even
though different topics are described and discussed in
Saunders’ writings, there is also an obvious continuity in
nearly all her publications (Saunders and Kastenbaum
1997); Saunders points to poor conditions for dying
patients in contemporary health care (Clark and Seymour
1999), and the need for safe, homelike places and profes-
sionals who are skilled in taking care of the dying person
(Saunders 1981, 1984). She discusses death as taboo in
Western society, and she calls for a new openness about
dying and death (Saunders 1998). Saunders points to the
necessity of including relatives in the lives of dying per-
sons, and the importance of total care, to relieve total pain.
The concept of total pain is a key concept in hospice phi-
losophy (Clark 1999b), developed by Saunders because of
something she learned from a patient. The elderly woman
described to Saunders how pain started in her back, ‘‘but
now it seems that all of me is wrong’’ (Clark 1999b:733).
The patient described her symptoms and worries, and how
she was cared for by her husband and son, but nevertheless
felt that everyone was against her. After pausing, the
patient continued, ‘‘But it is wonderful to begin to feel safe
again’’ (Clark 1999b:733). Saunders translated the story
into other words; ‘‘Without any further questions she had
talked of her mental as well as physical distress, of her
social problems and of her spiritual need for security’’
(Clark 1999b:728). In an article, published later the same
year, Saunders made use of the concept total pain. All of
me is wrong has become total pain (Clark 1999b:728).
The social dimension which is part of total pain and total
care is repeated and given attendance in many of Saunders
writings. In her first publication (Saunders 1958), we can
read about Mr. S., Mrs. A, Mrs. R. and Mr. H. Saunders
describes each of the four patients in four individual parts
in the article, beginning with Mr. S and ending with Mr.
H. The first sentence in each description is more or less
similar. The patient is presented by name (anonymous),
age, diagnosis and a characteristic attribute: Mr. H. is an
Irishman; the other three patients are an ‘‘educated and
intelligent housewife’’, a ‘‘housewife with five children’’,
and a ‘‘publishing manager and preacher of atheism at
Hyde Park Corner’’. From the very beginning of each case
study, Saunders reminds the reader that patients are more
than an interesting medical diagnosis. Patients are subjects,
connected or intersubjective related to others through
family, friends, work, religion, traditions, interests,
nationality and so on. In a moving article from 1961 called
A patient, Saunders describes in detail the story of Mrs. G.,
a woman and a patient she knew for 7 years. We will not
discuss all the aspects of this story, what is relevant here is
how Saunders sums up the things that brought Mrs. G.
through; first of all, people (Saunders 1961). Saunders
describes the patient’s husband and mother, friends, nurses
and doctors, what they meant to Mrs. G. and how they got
her ‘through’.
According to Saunders, the greatest sorrow of a dying
patient was the ending of relations and feeling useless
(Saunders 1984). The dying person needed recognition,
attention, someone present beside him or her, someone
willing to watch with me (Saunders 1978). What brought
meaning to patients close to death, but also to relatives and
professionals, seemed to be some sense of community or
belonging (Saunders 1981). David Tasma’s expressed need
for a home for the dying, and the need for inclusion,
community and common life is a distinct part of hospice
philosophy (Saunders 1999; Thoresen 2001). Dying
patients should not be hidden away behind curtains or left
alone (Saunders 1981). It is interesting to see how Saunders
defines religion as a ‘‘field of relationships of one person to
another, commitment in the context of a common life’’
(Schoenberg et al. 1972). Saunders argued, that if we want
to help others in their struggle to find meaning, we need to
build bridges between us, and be willing to watch with the
dying patient (Sykes and Saunders 1993). One may argue
that in Saunders’ writing, there are signs of an existing
bridge because Saunders repeatedly reminds us about the
fact that we all share the threat of death; it is a part of
human life, it is something that we all have in common.
Hospice today: an empirical study
From reading Saunders’ publications, we are left with the
impression that patients were listened to, bringing the
language, the narratives and phenomena of everyday life
into the world of medicine and professional caring. More
precisely, this is how Cicely Saunders describes what she
did, and what she thought was the best way of getting to
know the patients’ needs. This became a normative quest;
that one should learn from patients. One doctor, visiting St.
Christopher’s Hospice in 1970, tells how a chair was seen
as an important piece of equipment on the ward rounds,
because it was where one could sit down at eye-level with
the patient and talk (Clark et al. 2005). Based on obser-
vations in a hospice ward of today, there are reasons to ask
if the chair by the patient’s bed still holds a vital position.
The observations and participant observations were part
of a doctoral study, and took place in a Nordic hospice
ward.2 Trained as a nurse myself, I was allowed to follow
and be an assistant to seven hospice nurses in their work
with 20 patients, all staying in single-bed rooms. The main
2 The study has been approved by the National Research Ethics
Committee.
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goal of the four-month long field study was to gain direct
data and knowledge of hospice nurses’ practice towards
their patients. This means that the focus of the study was on
how nurses acted, talked and behaved when providing
patient care, and how they reflected and talked to me about
their caring work. I took part in conversations with patients
in ‘natural’ situations, but patients were not interviewed.
As far as I possibly could, I was aware of my self as a
researcher subject, and of intentionality and involvement in
the world also as an observer. I see the importance in
scientific work of trying to ‘‘slacken the intentional threads
which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our
notice’’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962:xv), which is a challenging
task. This make me aware of the fact that the following
descriptions are small parts of a larger picture, and that the
meaning given to the observations always can be chal-
lenged and discussed (Dahlberg 2006).
The ward is part of a hospice clinic in a larger town in
one of the Nordic countries. It has existed for around
20 years, and has its roots in the hospice movement.
Patients were mostly referred to the hospice ward by their
doctor, and were prioritised after the following criteria: (1)
Young patients with life-threatening diagnoses. (2) Patients
with life-threatening diagnoses living on their own. At the
time of the field study, the average stay in the ward was
30 days. The palliative team consists of nurses, enrolled
nurses, doctors, chaplain, social worker and physiothera-
pist. The ward was, in many ways, a realization of Saun-
ders’ idea about creating rooms for common life, for being
with others. Hospice values like these were expressed on
the ward’s homepage on the internet and in strategic doc-
uments and reports, and were visible in nice and inviting
interiors in the hospice common rooms. Bright colours,
comfortable and fine furniture, art, fresh flowers, table-
cloths and lit candles invited patients and relatives to enter
the room, occupy it, and to be there with others. The living
room was not a room for solitude and privacy, but for
social relations with others. Here, patients could feel at
home, feel safe and comforted. The paradox was that these
rooms were more or less empty through the days, weeks
and months that I made observations. On some days, dur-
ing lunch and dinner, a group of 2–4 patients would gather
around the nicely laid table to share a meal. As soon as the
meal was over, the patients would retire to their rooms. The
main impression was that patients did not seek comfort in
the company of others, but spent nearly all their time on
their own.
The absence of patients in the common room became
obvious in an early phase of the observation period. I spent
the first 8–10 days in the ward, observing from a chair in
the corridor, the living room and the conservatory. I did not
enter patient’s room until after the first 2 weeks of the
observation period. From the chair I could smell, hear,
watch, be aware of and wonder what was going on around
me. There was busy times and quiet hours, there were staff
walking between different rooms, some relatives passing
slowly on their way to visit a wife or a friend. Patients were
more or less absent. One or perhaps two might pass during
the hours, but the main impression was that common rooms
were patient free areas.
This was because patients spent nearly all time on their
own in their rooms. This was confirmed when I started to
follow the nurses into the patients. Of course relatives were
visiting; some of them spent many hours with the patient.
Including family and friends in the situation around the
seriously ill patient is a core issue in hospice care. What
surprised me was how many of the patients who actually
spent hours and hours in their own company. Often, when
entering the room, the patient was in bed and alone. The
nurse or other parts of the staff looked after the patient, and
they carried out different tasks, but they seldom had time to
sit down and be with the patient. As described earlier,
hospice has gone through major development and changes,
and it is easy to explain the patient in the bed on his own as
a result of this. A new lead clinician had declared that the
hospice should offer active palliative care. This implied
intensive medical treatment, more medical investigations,
and frequent use of feeding tubes. Better symptomatic
treatment is valuable and needed. On the other hand,
extended medicalization takes a lot of time and attention. I
observed how nurses could spend 1 hour on preparing
medicine for one patient, then half an hour or even more in
administering it. I hardly ever observed any of the nurses
attending a patient’s room without carrying medicine or
objects relating to treatment. Spending time with patients
without a goal or purpose was rare as far as I could see.
According to the nurses, patients seemed to be more poorly
when admitted to the hospice than previous patients had
been, which meant that they needed more help and care.
Some years ago, the nurses would take patients out for a
walk or to visit a cafe´, but this does not happen nowadays.
It is a paradox that even if the patients admitted were more
poorly than earlier, patients were frequently discharged to
their own home or to residential homes for elderly persons.
To make the stay at home possible, nurses spend much
more time on the phone to plan care properly.
Discussion
It is not a straightforward task to compare hospice phi-
losophy, which is very ideological and normative, with
hospice practice, especially when it is observed in a
country, time and context different to that in which it
originated. At the same time, looking both backwards and
towards the present, it is possible to point to some obvious
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changes in end-of-life care. Cicely Saunders was aware of
the social dimension of total pain; being with others brings
a sense of belonging and comfort. Creating places where
patients, relatives, friends, staff and locals could meet and
be together became a central part of hospice philosophy.
Based on a study from a Nordic hospice ward, we find that
sociality is still valued in official documents and in the
ward’s interior. Total care or holistic care is a main con-
cept; in this paper, we ask if there is a gap between caring
concepts and values, and the patient who spends a lot of
time on his/her own. There may be some more or less
obvious reasons for this. There is no doubt that end-of-life
care today is very much about palliative medical treatment
and care. The medical improvements are in many ways
self-legitimated, and very few will ask if there are any side
effects of this. Increasing numbers of patients and health-
care systems under economic pressure also indicate the
need for efficiency in all levels and parts of health-care
practice. This means evidence-based practice is now seen
as equivalent to best and effective practice. As previously
stated, it is difficult to challenge such changes and devel-
opments, because improved knowledge means fewer dis-
tressing symptoms. We believe that the impression of
seriously ill and dying persons spending much of their time
alone is connected to the medicalization of palliative care,
but also to demands for more care for less money. Staff
members are busy, and they have less time for each patient.
Still, there are other questions to be asked about these
observations. Why do patients not attend common room
facilities more frequently, and why is it that some patients
receive very few visitors? The answer may be that patients
are too ill to leave their room, or that, given the fact that an
increasing number of people in Western society live alone,
it may be that we are more used to, and even prefer, being
alone. Perhaps descriptions such as ‘frequently’ and ‘few’
are problematic, because they are inaccurate and relative.
How many visitors for how many hours, and how many
patients sitting in the chairs in the living room would meet
the normative quest from Saunders on community and
belonging? At what level does medical treatment that takes
time and resources become a problem and begin to chal-
lenge the original hospice values? What makes a hospice a
hospice? During the observation period, the nurses con-
veyed their uncertainty around this many times, asking if
the hospice ward was still a hospice. Their grounds for
asking this were more or less the same as the reasons the
study gave.
Is the concept of lifeworld useful when it comes to
analysing and reflecting further on end of life care in
hospice? We find the answer to be yes, most of all because
lifeworld raises our attention towards what kind of
knowledge and practice is present in hospice care, and it
helps us to look for dimensions as connectedness and
relations in hospice practice. Lifeworld is not a normative
concept in the sense that it will state how life should be
lived, or about certain important values or ethical princi-
ples, and it is not a caring theory. Lifeworld is not helpful
when it comes to what to do or how to communicate
towards dying persons, or in developing manuals for
nursing practice. It reminds us about something given
before knowledge and practice is developed and structured.
What is given is that we are connected to and responsible to
each other; we are each other’s world. Our lifeworlds touch
upon each other and open a space between us. This is a
space of possibilities, but also of risks and limitations. This
is an ethical space. In health care and nursing, there seems
to be a shift in what we find to be the source of normativity
or sound ethical practice. This is a shift from seeing ethical
principles and rules as the foundation to seeing the nor-
mative importance as already present in every (profes-
sional) encounter (Wyller et al. 2010), in every meeting
and relation. We find that a lifeworld perspective helps us
to see the other more clearly as a fellow human being, in
what Dahlberg et al. (2009) and Todres et al. (2007) call
human–world intimacy. We find that lifeworld points to a
kind of evident knowledge, understood as grounded and
deeply meaningful structures in life (Martinsen and Eri-
ksson 2009).
Conclusion
The phenomenological concept of lifeworld is significant
in developing reflections and knowledge on what it means
to live well and to die well. This is because lifeworld is
about concrete life and concrete structures in life. Struc-
tures or dimensions, like sociality, time, space and
embodiment contain rich possibilities for living life to the
full. These dimensions also make us vulnerable because
life is limited and ambiguous. In this article, the focus has
been on the dimension of sociality in end of life care; more
closely on connectedness and relations in hospice care. In
the writings of Cicely Saunders on caring for dying patients
in hospice, we find that much attention is given to the value
of being with others. No patient should face death on their
own. The study presented in this article revealed that in a
Nordic hospice ward this is still expressed as a main value
and goal for hospice care. Observations challenged this
picture; a main impression from the fieldwork period was
that patients spent many hours every day without other
persons company. We have discussed some reasons for
this, like medicalization and the request for a more effec-
tive, evidence based palliative care. We find that there are
reasons to ask if the development and medical improve-
ments in palliative care and in hospice care may limit the
possibilities for belonging and comfort that belongs to
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connectedness and relations. We hope that professionals
will take this question seriously and reflect further on this.
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